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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine,
and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement, Zane Lumpkin exercised his constitutional
right to a jury trial. He was found guilty as charged, and received a sentence of five years, with
two years fixed.
On appeal, he asserts that in its closing arguments, the prosecution committed misconduct
and diminished the State's burden of proof when it argued that a jury instruction not to open an
evidence bag during deliberations proved that the substance inside contained methamphetamine.
Although that misconduct was not objected to, it rises to the level of fundamental error.
Mr. Lumpkin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
his case for new trial.
Mr. Lumpkin also asserts that the district court infringed upon his constitutional right to a
jury trial when it punished him for making the "strange decision" to go to trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately three o'clock in the morning on October 17, 2018, Officer Zachary
Fisher stopped a speeding motorist for equipment violations. (Trial Tr., p.68, L.15 - p.72, L.25;
p.92, Ls.14-21.) Officer Fisher spoke to the three occupants of the car. (Trial Tr., p.74, L.2 p.75, L.8; State's Exhibit 1.) Officer Fisher smelled marijuana so he had the driver, Zane
Lumpkin, step out of the truck. (Trial Tr., p.94, Ls.19 - 25.) Mr. Lumpkin kept trying to reach
into his pocket, despite being told by the officer not to reach into his pockets. (Trial Tr., p.95,
L.9 - p.96, L.2; State's Exhibit 1.) Officer Fisher handcuffed Mr. Lumpkin. (Trial Tr., p.95,
L.23 - p.96, L.2; State's Exhibit 1.)

After he handcuffed him, Officer Fisher searched
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Mr. Lumpkin. (Trial Tr., p.78, Ls.8-17; State's Exhibit 1.) In Mr. Lumpkin's pocket, he found a
glass pipe containing white residue the officer believed could be methamphetamine.

(Trial

Tr., p.78, Ls.8-25; p.97, Ls.1-5; State's Exhibit 1, 2.) Mr. Lumpkin was charged by Information
with felony possession of a controlled substance and the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement for prior felony convictions. 1 (R., pp.39-42.)
A one-day jury trial was held.

(See Trial Tr.) At trial, Christina Rayner, a forensic

scientist employed by the Idaho State Police Lab, testified that the residue found in the pipe in
Mr. Lumpkin's pocket contained methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.117, Ls.2-7; p.124, Ls.2-8.)
Mr. Lumpkin testified that the pipe was borrowed from a friend and the white residue inside the
pipe was not smokable-it was "blow-off' or "garbage." (Trial Tr., p.139, L.21 - p.141, L.6.)
He testified that he did not know the pipe contained methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.146, Ls.1217.)
During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the fact that the
jury had been instructed in jury instruction number 18 not to open the evidence bag containing
the pipe was proof that the residue inside the pipe was methamphetamine, "If it was nothing, if
it's nothing, literally, why would you have an instruction specifically telling you don't open the
bag, because it might contaminate you.

There's obviously something in there, right; and

Ms. Rayner is able to test it." (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.1-15.) The jury found Mr. Lumpkin guilty of
possessing a controlled substance and of the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (Trial
Tr., p.168, Ls.13-20; R., pp.88-90.)

1

Mr. Lumpkin was also charged with misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, but that
charge was dismissed by the district court prior to trial. (R., pp.74-75.)
2

At Mr. Lumpkin's sentencing hearing, the State recommended a sentence of eight years,
with five years fixed. (1/16/19 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-18.) Defense counsel recommended a suspended
sentence with two years of probation.

(1/16/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-23.)

The district court

questioned why Mr. Lumpkin did not accept the prosecutor's plea offer before trial, telling
Mr. Lumpkin that he "certainly did not make this process easy," and noting that he did not
appear to have any defense, but he "insisted on going to trial." (1/16/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.7-19.) It
then sentenced him to five years, with two years fixed. (1/16/19 Tr., p.161, L.20 - pl 62, L.1.;
R., p.127.) The court also imposed a public defender reimbursement fee of $500, saying, "$500
to Bonner County to repay some of the costs of the public defender in this case for what certainly
I think was a strange decision to go to trial yesterday." (1/16/19 Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.3.) A
Judgment of Conviction was entered on January 16, 2019. (R., pp.127-30.) On January 17,
2019, Mr. Lumpkin filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.131-33, 142-46.)

3

ISSUES
I.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments by telling the jury
that the district court's instruction not to open an evidence bag proved that Mr. Lumpkin
possessed methamphetamine?

II.

Did the district court impermissibly punish Mr. Lumpkin for exercising his constitutional
right to trial?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Telling The Jury That
The District Court's Instructions Not To Open An Evidence Bag Proved That Mr. Lumpkin
Possessed Methamphetamine
A.

Introduction
Mr. Lumpkin asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and the

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, told the jury that the
district court would not have instructed them not to open the evidence bag if there were not
methamphetamine in there, i.e., that the district court's instruction to the jury proved the State's
case. Although this error is unpreserved, these constitutional violations are clear from the record
and actually affected the trial's outcome. In light of the error, Mr. Lumpkin respectfully requests
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the

misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141 (2014). Alleged constitutional errors not followed by a contemporaneous objection are
reviewed under the fundamental error standard. State v. Bernal, 164 Idaho 190, 193 (2018)
(citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010)). Fundamental error review includes a threeprong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2)
plainly exists (meaning the record "must contain evidence of the error and the record must also
contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object");
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and (3) the appellate record must establish that the unpreserved error "actually affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings." State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, _, 443 P.3d 129, 133-34
(2019).

Mr. Lumpkin acknowledges that he did not contemporaneously object to the

prosecutor's statements and thus the statements must be evaluated as fundamental error.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Telling The Jury That
The District Court's Instructions To The Jury Proved That Mr. Lumpkin Possessed
Methamphetamine
"[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due
process."' Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, ensures a
criminal trial has guarantees such as the rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process
that serve to protect of the accused from prosecutorial and judicial abuses.

Gannett Co. v.

DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 (1979). The Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[n] o person shall be
... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process oflaw." IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.
Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99

Idaho 18, 19 (1978). A defendant has a Constitutional right to have a jury pass on the question
of whether an offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 278 (1993) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated.").
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Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez,
142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005).

In order to constitute a due process violation, the

prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial. The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of

society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
"Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused."

State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35,

, 71 P. 608, 611

(1903). The prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only
competent evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id.
The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.

During his rebuttal closing remarks to the jury, the prosecutor told the jury:
Counsel also talked about the residue, how it's not a weighable amount and it's
smoke. And I'll reference another jury instruction for you, number 18. 2 This is

2

Jury Instruction No. 18 states:
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interesting. So it tells you, certain items that have been admitted into evidence
may contain substance residue. To preclude contamination of the evidence and to
preclude such residue from coming into contact with you, the evidence has been
placed in sealed plastic bags.
You are not to unseal the plastic bags when dealing with the evidence during
deliberation. What do you think that means? If there's nothing in those ziplock
bags, why would you have a jury instruction telling you don't open the bag
because you might come in contact with it, right? So if you want to talk about,
well, it's not a weighable amount, it's nothing, I think the defendant testified that
it's nothing, it's garbage. It's nothing, it's blow-off
If it was nothing, if it's nothing, literally, why would you have an instruction
specifically telling you don't open the bag, because it might contaminate you.
There's obviously something in there, right; and Ms. Rayner is able to test it.

(Trial Tr., p.163, L.17 - p.164, L.15.)
The prosecutor asked the jury to infer guilt from a jury instruction. The elements the
State must prove in order for the jury to convict a defendant of possession of a controlled
substance are well-established. See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999). In order to find
Mr. Lumpkin guilty of possession of methamphetamine, the jury had to find the State proved that
Mr. Lumpkin possessed methamphetamine. (R., p.107.) By telling the jury that the court's
instruction proved the pipe contained methamphetamine, the State sought to be relieved of its
burden to prove an essential element of the offense (i.e., that the substance at issue was
methamphetamine).

(See R., p.107.)

The prosecutor's statement attempted to create an

irrebuttable presumption through the jury instruction, thereby eliminating the State's burden to
prove the identity of the substance.

Certain items that have been admitted into evidence may contain controlled
substance residue. To preclude contamination of the evidence and to preclude
such residue form coming into contact with you, the evidence has been placed in
sealed plastic bags. You are not to unseal the plastic bags when viewing the
evidence during deliberations.
(R., p.112.)
8

1.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Reduced The State's Burden Of
Proving All Of The Material Elements Of The Offense

A defendant has a Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to have a jury pass on the question of
whether an offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 278 (1993) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated.").
By telling the jury that the district court instructed them not to open the evidence bag
because the substance inside the bag really was methamphetamine, the prosecution committed
misconduct. The prosecutor's closing statements reduced the State's burden of proof-essentially, the prosecution eliminated a material element of the offense when it told the jury that
the district court's instruction to the jury proved the substance was methamphetamine.

See

State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Misconduct may occur by the prosecutor

diminishing or distorting the State's burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
2.

The Prosecutor's Misconduct Constitutes Fundamental Error Requiring This
Court To Vacate Mr. Lumpkin's Conviction

Although Mr. Lumpkin did not object to the prosecutor's improper arguments, he asserts
that the prosecutor's argument amounts to fundamental error necessitating this Court to vacate
his conviction. "Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate
courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in question
qualifies as fundamental error ... " State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).

"Such review

includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the
appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
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contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 228. Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court
"reemphasize[ d] that in order to satisfy [the second Perry prong] a defendant bears the burden of
showing clear error in the record," meaning the record "must contain evidence of the error and
the record must also contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision
in failing to object." State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, _, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019). Where the
record contains no "evidence regarding whether counsel's decision was strategic, the claim is
factual in nature and thus more appropriately addressed via a petition for post-conviction relief"
Id. Further, whereas a defendant previously satisfied Perry's third prong by "proving there is a

reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial," Miller held that the
appellate record must establish that the unpreserved error "actually affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings." Id. 165 Idaho at_, 443 P.3d at 134. (emphasis added).

a.

The Prosecutor's Misconduct Violated Mr. Lumpkin's Constitutional
Rights

With respect to due process, the United States Supreme Court has explained why the
prosecutor cannot lower the government's burden of proof, holding:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on

any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
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Here, the prosecutor eliminated one of the elements of the offense by telling the jury that
the district court's instruction proved the substance was methamphetamine. It was misconduct
for the prosecutor to tell the jurors that the district court's instruction to them proved the
substance was methamphetamine. In telling the jury that the instruction proved the identity of
the substance, the State lowered its burden to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mr. Lumpkin asserts that his right to a fair trial by jury, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated by the prosecutor's reduction of the State's burden of proof during closing arguments.
b.

The Error Is Clear From The Record Because The Record Shows The
Failure To Object Was Not Strategic Or Tactical

This error is clear from the record. The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on
its face, and there is no reason to believe that Mr. Lumpkin's counsel was "sandbagging" the
district court by failing to object to the prosecutor's misconduct.
The elements the State must prove in order for the jury to convict a defendant of
possession of a controlled substance are well-established.

See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,

240 (1999). There is simply no strategic advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to
object to, and to ask the court to correct, the prosecutor's elimination of one element of the
charged crime. There is no legitimate strategic or tactical reason for defense counsel to choose
not to object to such a statement. No reasonable defense attorney would want an element of the
offense eliminated, because doing so serves no other purpose than to make it easier for the jury
to convict the defendant. In this case, the prosecutor's improper argument allowed the jury to
find Mr. Lumpkin guilty absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the residue in the pipe
actually contained methamphetamine.
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The record demonstrates that Mr. Lumpkin's counsel did not make a tactical decision not
to object. Although defense counsel did not make opening remarks, she elicited the defense's
theory from Mr. Lumpkin's testimony during the defense's case-in-chief (Trial Tr., p.137, L.1 p.146, L.22.)

Mr. Lumpkin repeatedly testified that the substance in the pipe was not

methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.138, L.21 - p.139, L.8; p.139, Ls.15-22; p.140, L.1 - p.141, L.6;
p.143, L.13 - p.144, L.24; p.146, Ls.12-17.) Mr. Lumpkin's defense consistently focused on his
insistence that it was not methamphetamine in the pipe, but that the pipe contained simply a
white film that was "garbage" byproduct.

(Trial Tr., p.137, L.1 - p.146, L.22.)

At the

conclusion of the trial, in her closing remarks defense counsel talked again about Mr. Lumpkin's
testimony that there was no methamphetamine in the pipe. (See Trial Tr., p.161, L.1 - p.162,
L.15.)
Given that the entire defense rested on the argument that there was no methamphetamine
present, there was no strategic or tactical reason to allow the prosecutor to eliminate the State's
burden of proving this element. Therefore, under Miller, Mr. Lumpkin has met his burden to
show the error plainly exists.
c.
The

State's

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Actually Affected The Trial's Outcome
evidence

against

Mr.

Lumpkin

was

tenuous.

The

amount

of

methamphetamine in the pipe was not a weighable amount-there was no weight to it. (Trial
Tr., p.123, L.24 - p.124, L.1; p.125, Ls.15-18.) There was a white film on the inside of the pipe
stem. (Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.23-25; p.114, Ls.3-10.) Thus, the pipe appeared empty-there was not
a solid, burned substance visible inside the pipe. (Confidential Exh., 3 p.9 (State's Exh. 2); Trial
Tr., p.96, L.23 - p.97, L.5.)

3

The designation "Confidential Exh." refers to the pagination of the electronic file containing all
of the paper exhibits in the case.
12

As such, this case came down to a determination of the identity of the substance-did the
jury believe the State's witnesses, or did the jury believe Mr. Lumpkin's testimony that the
substance inside the pipe was not methamphetamine, and/or that he did not know there was
methamphetamine in the pipe? As such, it is clearly improper that at closing arguments, the
prosecutor eliminated one of the elements of the offense of possession of a controlled substance
by telling the jury that the district

court's

instruction proved the

substance was

methamphetamine. In light of the weak evidence in this case, and the egregious prosecutorial
misconduct, Mr. Lumpkin has shown the prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the outcome
of the trial. See Miller, 165 Idaho at_, 443 P.3d at 134. He respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Impermissibly Punished Mr. Lumpkin For Taking His Case To Trial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Lumpkin asserts that his rights to a jury trial, to due process, and to maintain his

innocence, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated when the district court
repeatedly disparaged his exercise ofhis right to a jury trial (1/16/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.7-19) and went
on to impose a sentence in excess of that requested by defense counsel, as well as a "$500 [fine]
to Bonner County to repay some of the costs of the public defender in this case for what certainly
I think was a strange decision to go to trial yesterday" (1/16/19 Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.3).
Mr. Lumpkin asserts that the district court's sentence and $500 fine was punitive-imposed
because he exercised his rights to maintain his innocence and to a jury trial. The district court's
sentence and fine violated his rights and requires a new sentencing hearing.
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B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court exercises free review when determining whether constitutional rights

have been violated in light of the facts of the individual case. State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738,
740 (2007). Sentencing decisions are evaluated for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267, 284 (2003).

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an

excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). In reviewing a trial
court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
In this case, the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to act
consistently with applicable legal standards and within the confines of its discretion because it
imposed the sentence that did as punishment for Mr. Lumpkin's exercise of his constitutional
rights.

C.

The District Court Violated Mr. Lumpkin's Right To Due Process By Penalizing Him For
Going To Trial
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a sentencing court may not penalize a

defendant for exercising his right to put the government to its burden of proof at trial, or to
maintain his innocence throughout sentencing and beyond so that he may also exercise his right
to an appeal. State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 157 (Ct. App. 1986) ( "The defendant retains the
right to appeal the judgment of conviction.

A court should not coerce a defendant into
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sacrificing the right to assert innocence by threatening a more severe sentence."); see also
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 814 (Ct. App. 2010). However, a sentencing court can use the

defendant's unwillingness to acknowledge guilt in its determination of whether the defendant is
capable ofrehabilitation. Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 157; Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815.
A sentencing court's decision to weigh a defendant's claims of innocence against him
has been found to constitute a due process violation. For example, in Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d
393 (3rd Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found a due process violation where the
sentencing judge implicitly told the defendant that, had he abandoned his claim of innocence, he
would have received a lighter sentence. Id. at 396-98.
Another example can be found in People v. Byrd, 487 N.E. 2d 1275 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986).
In that case, the Court held that:
A more severe sentence may not be imposed because a defendant refuses to
abandon his claim of innocence, or because he has exercised his constitutional
right to trial. In determining whether sentencing was improperly influenced by a
defendant's failure to admit his guilt following a conviction, the court's focus is
upon whether the sentencing court indicated, either expressly or impliedly, that
there would be better treatment on sentencing if the defendant abandoned his
claim of innocence. Here, the court specifically referred to defendant's continued
denial of any involvement. Therefore, we must conclude that defendant's
sentence was improperly influenced by his continuing denial of guilt.
Defendant's sentence must be vacated and a new sentencing hearing must be held
without consideration of his continuing denial of guilt.
Id. at 1280 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, in the present case, the district court could have considered Mr. Lumpkin's
assertion of innocence in assessing his potential for rehabilitation, but it was not allowed to have
used that assertion of innocence or his decision to go to trial as grounds to punish Mr. Lumpkin
further. However, the district court told Mr. Lumpkin just before pronouncing his sentence:
Character and attitude, I don't have a presentence report, but Mr. Lumpkin, you
certainly did not make this process easy.
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The Court took what I think is a very unusual step for this Court, but I brought
you over to try to explain to you what you were looking at in this case; and
actually, the State had made what I thought was quite a fair offer. And you, just
out of hand, were not even willing to consider that.
I tried to explain that you're going to jury trial in a case where there didn't appear
to be any defense, just in reading the reports, and that you were looking at the
persistent violator. And you insisted on going to trial. Mr. Lumpkin, everyone
has a right to go to trial.
Then we get to the end of the trial and you're - yesterday afternoon you're talking
about being railroaded and how unfair everything was.
So I just wanted to remind you of the fact of the choices that you made.
(1/16/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-25.)
After questioning Mr. Lumpkin's decision to go to trial, the district court fashioned an
underlying sentence considerably harsher than what was recommended by the defense.

(Compare 1/16/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-11 (district court imposing five years, with two fixed); with,
1/16/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-22 (defense counsel recommending a suspended sentence with two years
of probation).) Further, the district court charged Mr. Lumpkin "$500 to Bonner County to repay
some of the costs of the public defender in this case for what certainly I think was a strange
decision to go to trial yesterday." (1/16/19 Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.3.) Mr. Lumpkin asserts that
the district court's comments at sentencing and its imposition of reimbursement were not
considerations about rehabilitative potential, but sought to inform Mr. Lumpkin that the district
court was punishing him for exercising his due process rights.

Thus, it appears that

Mr. Lumpkin's sentence was improperly fashioned based on his decision to go to trial and his
continuing denial of guilt.
The district court's sentence and its decision to require Mr. Lumpkin pay $500 punished
the exercise of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a jury trial and risks chilling other
defendants' exercise of their own rights.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Lumpkin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this
matter for a new trial. In the alternative, Mr. Lumpkin requests that his case be remanded for
resentencing by a different district court judge.
DATED this 6th day ofNovember, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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